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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
application of the fast fashion business model outside the 
apparel industry. The study reviews the business history 
of Swatch and investigates its business model at the time 
when the brand was introduced to the market. Swatch 
repositioned the watch as an accessory or a fashion item, 
rather than a timepiece, initiating a dramatic strategic 
shift within a rigid and traditional Swiss watch industry.
Design/Methodology/Approach – Due to the limited 
availability of studies researching applications of the 
fast fashion business model outside the apparel indus-
try, this study is explorative in its nature and utilizes the 
case study method. The data necessary for developing a 
case study originates from secondary sources and from 
a series of in-depth interviews. 
Findings and implications – Swatch developed a com-
pletely new business model to the watch industry. As 
the case analysis discusses, this model consisted of sev-
eral elements commonly related to the fast fashion busi-
ness model. This extended the fast fashion model across 
the traditional boundaries of the apparel industry.
Limitations – Due to a focus on one case study, which 
assumes industry specifi c factors, generalization of fi nd-
ings are limited.
Sažetak
Svrha – Svrha ovog rada jest istražiti primjenu poslovnog 
modela brze mode (fast fashion) izvan odjevne industri-
je. Ovaj rad analizira poslovnu povijest marke Swatch te 
istražuje njezin poslovni model u trenutku ulaska na trži-
šte. Swatch je repozicionirao ručni sat kao modni doda-
tak, odnosno dio mode, nasuprot tradicionalnoj percep-
ciji mjerača vremena. Taj je potez uzrokovao dramatičnu 
promjenu strategije unutar nefl eksibilne i tradicionalne 
švicarske industrije satova. 
Metodološki pristup – S obzirom na ograničenu dostu-
pnost znanstvenih studija koje bi obrađivale aplikacije 
poslovnog modela brze mode izvan odjevne industrije, 
ova je studija eksplorativnog karaktera i primjenjuje me-
todu studije slučaja. Podaci potrebni za razvoj studije 
slučaja prikupljeni su iz sekundarnih izvora te kroz seriju 
dubinskih intervjua. 
Rezultati i implikacije – Swatch je razvio potpuno nov 
poslovni model unutar industrije satova. Kao što analiza 
poslovne studije sugerira, riječ je o modelu koji se sasto-
ji od nekoliko elemenata koji se vežu uz koncept brze 
mode (fast fashion). Ovo zapravo predstavlja slučaj kori-
štenja modela brze mode u kontekstu izvan tradicional-
nih granica modne industrije.
Market-Tržište

























Originality – Fast fashion related research is primarily 
focused on the apparel industry, as the environment in 
which the model was originally developed. This study 
extends fast fashion as a concept with valid applications 
outside its traditional industry.
Keywords – fast fashion, new product development, 
watch industry, business history, marketing strategy, 
country-of-origin eff ect
Ograničenja – S obzirom na usredotočenost na jednu 
studiju poslovnog slučaja koja uključuje faktore speci-
fi čne za dotičnu industriju, ograničena je generalizacija 
rezultata istraživanja.
Doprinos – Istraživanje poslovnog modela brze mode 
primarno je usredotočeno na modnu industriju kao okru-
ženje u kojem je navedeni model razvijen. Ovaj rad pri-
stupa brzoj modi kao konceptu koji može funkcionirati i 
izvan svog tradicionalnog okruženja. 
Ključne riječi – brza moda, razvoj novog proizvoda, in-
dustrija satova, povijest poslovanja, marketinška strategi-
ja, učinak zemlje podrijetla






















As a contemporary term, fast fashion is most-
ly related to the clothing brands such Zara or 
H&M. Sometimes referred to as a disposable or 
throwaway fashion concept, it is associated with 
delivering fashion products to a mass market at 
relatively low prices (Morgan & Birtwistle, 2009; 
Hines, 2007). The watch industry follows diff er-
ent patterns. Traditionally, buying a high-quali-
ty handmade timepiece would probably occur 
just once or twice in a lifetime. However, even 
the very traditional and rigid wristwatch market 
changed with the automation of production 
in the 1950s and 1960s and the introduction of 
watches with quartz movement in the 1970s 
(Glasmeier, 2000). Technological advancements 
improved production effi  ciency and reduced 
cost, so the markets were fl ooded with cheaper 
and aff ordable watches. Thus, the buying pat-
terns changed since even consumers with low-
er purchasing power could now aff ord a watch. 
The Swiss watch industry, as the long-standing 
world leader, did not embrace the technologi-
cal change on time. Consequently, the industry 
was faced with a serious downturn and crisis 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Donzé, 2015). 
The salvation and rebirth of the Swiss watch in-
dustry is related to the introduction of Swatch 
– a plastic and inexpensive watch with quartz 
movement – together with the implementation 
of a new business model that repositioned the 
watch as an accessory or a fashion item, rather 
than a timepiece (Donzé, 2014).
The aim of this study is to review the business 
history of Swatch and the development and 
introduction of a new business model that 
strongly resembles the more recent concept 
of fast fashion. This study investigates the ap-
plication of the fast fashion model outside the 
apparel industry by analyzing Swatch’s turn-
around strategy, introduced in the early 1980s, 
that drove the company toward the position of 
one of the largest wristwatch manufacturers in 
the world. 
2. BRIEF HISTORIC 
AND CONTEXTUAL 
BACKGROUND
Besides banking and chocolate, watchmaking 
is among major Swiss industries with a tradition 
spanning more than four centuries (Fondation 
de la Haute Horlogerie, 2017). Initially developed 
by protestant Huguenots who found retreat in 
Geneva, Swiss watchmaking fl ourished during 
the 17th and 18th century (Donzé, 2015; Mu-
dambi, 2005). For centuries, Swiss watchmakers 
dominated world markets.  However, in the lat-
ter half of the 20th century, some major product 
and production process improvements were in-
troduced. As a major improvement, in the 1950s 
and the 1960s, mass production systems were 
developed and widely embraced by watchmak-
ers worldwide (Glasmeier, 2000). However, the 
Swiss watchmaking industry just partially ad-
opted these improvements, still focusing most-
ly on the cost intensive manual production of 
quality watches (Donzé, 2014). 
Another blow for the Swiss watch industry 
came with the development and commercial-
ization of quartz movement – a battery-pow-
ered, low cost and very precise alternative to the 
traditional mechanical movement. Surprisingly, 
the Swiss watch industry, led the process of re-
search and development of the new technolo-
gy together with Japan and the United States, 
but was unable to adopt and commercialize 
the innovation (Donzé, 2015). Japanese watch 
companies like Seiko, Citizen and Casio quickly 
switched to electronic watches and, as a result, 
Japan became a world leader in watch produc-
tion by the late 1970s (Glasmeier, 2000).
As Japanese and Hong Kong producers fl ooded 
the lower-end market in the 1970s, they were 
not at fi rst considered a real threat to estab-
lished Swiss producers. The Swiss watch indus-
try was, at some point, aware of the developing 
price competition. However, the industry was 
sure the “pin-lever”, also called the roskopf watch 
(i.e. a thinner and lighter mechanical watch de-
veloped by G. F. Roskopf), would handle the Far 





















East competition (Dreifuss, 2011). The traditional 
Swiss watchmakers believed that only a me-
chanical movement would maintain their repu-
tation and that quartz movement would betray 
the art of fi tting 200-300 pieces into a mechanic 
watch movement. Unfortunately, that was just 
another self-deception. With time, as they es-
tablished a stronger presence at the lower end 
of the market, Far Eastern producers started to 
trade up and gradually launch new watch mod-
els that took away even more market share from 
Swiss producers. 
The emergence of quartz and the stillness of 
the Swiss watch industry prompted “the watch-
making crisis” between the mid-1970s and the 
mid-1980s, which put the industry’s future and 
survival under serious threat (Donzé, 2015). The 
tide turned with the launch of Swatch in 1983 
(Donzé, 2014). Soon after its introduction, the 
market accepted the new brand but also the 
concept of seasonal collections, frequent in-
troductions of new designs and a very short 
product life cycle. Swatch was positioned as an 
accessory capable of measuring time. Due to 
its simple design, it was not possible to open 
the casing to repair the watch or to change a 
battery. It was a disposable watch with a limit-
ed life span, destined to be soon replaced by a 
newer trendy design. Consequently, a customer 
base of returning customers emerged, which 
was a completely new development within a 
very traditional watch market, especially among 
Swiss-made brands. Multiple purchases yield-
ed higher revenues, which helped the industry 
to restructure and to re-establish itself on the 
world market (Donzé, 2011).
3. LITERATURE REVIEW: 
STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF 
FAST FASHION
The main idea underlining the fast fashion 
concept is to promote fashion consumption as 
something trendy, aff ordable, fast, and dispos-
able (Payne, 2011). While the traditional fashion 
life cycle usually spans two yearly collections 
(seasons) with in-season replenishments, fast 
fashion moves away from this concept by intro-
ducing shorter product life cycles and creating 
smaller collections or merely a set of individual 
items (without replenishments) that are mar-
keted more frequently as a quick response to 
fast-changing consumer demands (Barnes & 
Lea-Greenwood, 2006). The fast fashion concept 
we recognize today emerged over many years as 
apparel retailers in general (and Zara and H&M 
among apparel retailers in particular) were look-
ing for a business model to provide a competi-
tive advantage in the ever more dynamic apparel 
fashion industry (The Economist, 2005).
Industry dynamics fl uctuate primarily for two 
main reasons: change in consumer tastes (re-
fl ected through demand pattern life cycles) 
and production and diff usion of knowledge or 
innovation (Grant, 2016). The fast fashion con-
cept has been profoundly impacted by the con-
fl uence of both factors. By constantly striving 
to match and lead changing consumer tastes, 
fashion retailers started to introduce fresh de-
signs of merchandise in shorter intervals of time, 
eff ectively shortening product life cycles (Collet, 
Cluver & Chen, 2013).
This fashion trend was primarily picked up by 
young, fashion conscious consumers who were 
looking for trendy products at aff ordable pric-
es, as the main value proposition of fast fashion. 
Such consumers are ideally fashion driven and 
seek immediate availability of currently trend-
ing items. The availability of diff erent designs 
is very important for them, as is the low price 
and matching quality (Walters, 2006). Hines and 
Bruce (2001) point out specifi cally that fast fash-
ion items primarily target female consumers 
within the 16 to 24 age group. 
Delivering a product to the market faster than 
direct competition is not an instant source of 
success unless that product matches the spe-
cifi c and fast-changing needs and wants of 
fi ckle young consumers. Hence, the capabilities 
of fashion-oriented companies in recognizing 
those needs and designing and marketing ap-
propriate garments emerged as a fi rst step and 





















key driver of success of the fast fashion business 
model. 
Marketing eff orts are not only directed at dis-
covering the needs of consumers but on cre-
ating them as well. This is especially noticeable 
through the promotion of fashion products as 
(artifi cially) scarce, with limited time and quantity 
availability, and quickly disposable (Payne, 2011) 
which makes them inevitably “hot” and “fast”. 
The resulting consumer excitement is refl ected 
in long queues before store openings (La Ferla, 
2000) and a high frequency of store visits. Many 
items (models) are almost never reproduced 
and resold and stock availability is minimum to 
none; the product is either bought on the spot 
or the real risk of not buying it ever is created. 
This approach results in less store-based inven-
tory investment for the retailer as well as in less 
of a need for markdowns, clearance sales, and 
other in-store promotional eff orts.
Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s compa-
nies increasingly realized that a faster delivery 
of goods to the market had numerous com-
petitive benefi ts for them, especially in indus-
tries marked by fast-changing consumer tastes. 
Matching those trends and tastes faster (sooner) 
than competitors opens the possibility for high-
er lead margins, fewer clearance sales, lower 
warehousing costs, and higher-frequency visits 
of customers to the stores. Next to these fi rm 
level benefi ts, other benefi ts that span the en-
tire supply chain are also achievable, most nota-
bly higher capacity utilization and shorter lead 
times through information exchange. The con-
cept of Quick Response (QR) is used to denote 
these eff orts (Harrison & Hoek, 2008). QR is ba-
sically a set of technologies that enable higher 
levels of cooperation and coordination among 
supply chain participants (Palmer & Markus, 
2000). Other strategic concepts also emerged 
at the time, clearly showing a gradual increase 
in awareness of the new competitive advantage 
arising from fast time to market, such as time-
based competition introduced by Stalk (1988).
Marketing demands for increasingly shorter lead 
times coupled with operational focus on low 
costs translate into a high need for coordination 
between adjacent phases of the supply chain 
(Choi, 2013; Sheridan, Moore & Nobbs, 2006). 
The need for short lead times resulted in placing 
key supply chain functions in close proximity to 
main markets. Zara, for example, located its pro-
duction facilities in close proximity to countries 
such as Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and Morocco 
in order to quickly serve the European market 
(Sowray, 2015; Escalona Orcao & Ramos Pérez, 
2014; Tokatli, 2008). As short lead times necessi-
tated a high level of coordination, market-based 
relationships between adjacent phases of sup-
ply chain always had the risk of lurking oppor-
tunism which kept transaction costs relatively 
high. In order to keep them under control, Zara, 
for example, operates as a vertically integrated 
business model, with highly automated pro-
duction processes (Petro, 2012) instead of out-
sourcing production to Far Eastern countries, as 
many other apparel retailers have done.
Smaller production batches spread out through 
multiple seasons throughout the year help in-
crease the effi  ciency of the supply chain. Classic 
(two season a year) apparel retailers place their 
main orders twice a year, which causes severe 
strains across all the supply chain phases. Ca-
pacity is not utilized effi  ciently with high-low 
trend of sourcing and selling. On the other 
hand, multiple smaller if not continuous pro-
duction runs throughout the year enable lower 
overall capacity installed and, consequently, its 
higher utilization (Caro & Martínez-de-Albéniz, 
2015). However, the need for coordination in-
creases, which explains why many fast fashion 
companies opt for vertically integrated business 
model (Zara and Swatch, as will be demonstrat-
ed in subsequent analysis). 
While the fast fashion business model is cele-
brated for its superior effi  ciency, its main critique 
is grounded in perceived lack of social respon-
sibility of companies using the model. On the 
downstream part of the supply chain, the top of 
the concern list is occupied by the problem of 
environmental impact of disposed items once 
their quick and short life cycle ends (Nguyen, 





















2012). On the upstream part of the supply chain, 
main concerns are related to lax work-related 
practices of fast fashion companies, which of-
ten locate production in low-income countries 
with an abundance of low-skill labor and weak 
regulatory framework (Arrigo, 2013).
The fast fashion model is not limited just to one 
specifi c formula. Due to a mix of various key suc-
cess factors, companies developed their own 
customized business models to achieve strate-
gic fi t within their respective value chains. Their 
eff orts have ranged from the retailing phase 
through upstream operations, which eventual-
ly resulted in a complete redesign of the entire 
supply chain of fashion products (Shen, 2014; 
Joy, Sherry, Venkatesh, Wang & Chan, 2012; Lo-
pez & Fan, 2009; Tokatli, 2008). As Runfola and 
Guercini (2013) suggest, there is a variety of fast 
fashion formulas (FFF), such as:
o those focused on providing rapid proactive 
“services” to retail customers;
o those dedicated to the supply manage-
ment and lead time reduction;
o those focused on eliminating the time lag 
between the design phase and introduc-
tion to the market;
o those aimed at reducing the time con-
sumed during the creative/design process 
in order to push new products to the mar-
ket in a timely manner.
In general, the fast fashion concept delineates 
an integrative business model, which spans the 
processes from creating and detecting consum-
er trends and engaging in closely coordinated 
production to the distribution of products in 
the shortest time possible. Product price must 
be as low as possible with commensurate qual-
ity and very trendy design. Lead time is of ex-
treme importance to create the hype among 
consumers eagerly awaiting a new shipment 
and to decrease the possibility of fast compet-
itor matching of design. Low production quan-
tity which results in minimum or no stock aids 
retailers by eliminating the need for markdowns 
and acts as an incentive for the consumer to 
purchase on the spot without deferment. The 
long-term success factor for many fast fashion 
companies lies in replicating this pattern while 
maintaining the high appeal of its products.
While the fast fashion model is traditionally being 
investigated and analyzed within the boundaries 
of fashion industry, patterns of the model can 
be detected in other industries in which some 
companies also expedited their business models, 
e.g. Seven Eleven Japan (Matsuo & Ogawa, 2007). 
Elements of the fast fashion model can also be 
detected within the consumer electronics in-
dustry, where the time between new product 
introductions is being reduced and more fl exible 
production capacities are installed to respond to 
demand more quickly (Caro & Martínez-de-Al-
béniz, 2015; Knowledge@Wharton, 2013).
4. RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1. Research propositions
The body of literature defi nes fast fashion as a 
concept that belongs to the fashion industry, 
and available studies commonly use diff erent 
fashion companies as references. These limita-
tions provoke interest for further research of 
the potential fast fashion model application in 
a complementary industry, such as fashion ac-
cessory industry. According to The Dictionary 
of Fashion History (Cumming, Cunnington & 
Cunnington, 2010, p. 1), accessory is “an item 
which contributes to the overall eff ect but is of 
secondary importance […] accessories usually 
complete an outfi t and are chosen to comple-
ment it.” Due to a vast number of fashion acces-
sories, this study is limited to the watch industry.
With the introduction of Swatch, the Swiss 
watch industry embraced a new business strat-
egy that clearly borrowed some ideas and con-
cepts from the fashion industry and the fast 
fashion business model. Novelties, such as sea-
sonal collections and trendy designs, innovated 
the industry and changed purchasing patterns 
among consumers. Therefore, the following re-
search proposition is developed:





















P1. The business model introduced by 
Swatch is founded on elements of the fast 
fashion business model.
Having worked so well for many clothing com-
panies, a natural development of the fast fash-
ion model would be to test it in other industries 
as well. This is the new research direction that 
Caro and Martínez-de-Albéniz (2015) suggested 
in their concise review of the fast fashion busi-
ness model. Having in mind the variety of FFFs 
(Runfola & Guercini, 2013), the model’s develop-
ment outside the fashion industry must address 
other industry specifi cs. Therefore, the follow-
ing research proposition is developed: 
P2. The fast fashion model is applicable out-
side the fashion industry, but with neces-
sary customization and adaptation.
4.2. Research method
Due to limited availability of research studies de-
scribing the application of the fast fashion model 
outside the fashion industry, this study has an ex-
plorative role. Thus, the inductive use of a quali-
tative case study has been selected as the most 
appropriate method. Case study itself could be 
defi ned as “an intensive study of a specifi c individ-
ual or specifi c context” (Trochim & Donnelly, 2007, 
p. 147). Considering it a reference point in the 
context of industrial marketing (Piekkari, Plakoy-
iannaki & Welch, 2009), Yin (2009, p. 18) provides 
a more comprehensive defi nition stating that 
the case study is “an empirical inquiry that inves-
tigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident.” Due to its intensity, a case study 
requires data collection over a sustained period of 
time (Creswell, 2009). This empirical study is qual-
itative in its nature. The main advantage of the 
qualitative approach is that it “provides research-
er with deeper levels of understanding new or 
complex phenomena by yielding a high level of 
detail” (Golic & Davis, 2012, p. 732). The research 
method applied in this study follows the six-step 
process (i.e. plan, design, prepare, collect, analyze, 
and share), as suggested by Yin (2009).
Due to the uniqueness of the phenomenon (i.e. 
application of the FFF outside the fashion in-
dustry) and convenience, the case for this study 
was selected on the basis of purposive sam-
pling (Yin, 2009; Patton, 2002). The data needed 
for the case study development was collected 
from publicly available secondary sources and 
through primary research. While secondary 
sources provided a general overview of the busi-
ness history of Swatch, primary research yielded 
valuable insights into the developments behind 
the scenes. Furthermore, primary research also 
clarifi ed some inconsistencies and missing links 
within secondary sources.
Primary research included two in-depth in-
terviews with Mr. Peter Petersen, CEO of the 
Swatch SA between 1987 and 1998, conducted 
in 2015. As a member of the company’s senior 
management, Mr. Petersen actively participat-
ed in the process of brand development and 
global market penetration in the early days of 
Swatch. The interviews were recorded and tran-
scripts were developed for the purpose of quali-
tative analysis.
The interview agenda comprised general ques-
tions regarding the industry and historical con-
text, together with more specifi c items address-
ing elements of the FFF revealed in the literature 
review. This approach combines exploration 
and theory testing research, in this particular or-
der. As suggested by Dull and Hak (2008, p. 175), 
this approach represents “a more eff ective con-
tribution to theory development than spending 
the same time and resources on theory-build-
ing research.” The authors argue that interview-
ees (i.e. practitioners) are usually familiar with a 
range of basic theories or “theories-in-use” and 
that exploration is more appropriate for fi nding 
and formulating propositions than “discovering” 
new propositions.
5. FINDINGS: THE SWATCH 
CASE STUDY
After years of struggle with the Far Eastern and 
U.S. competition, the Swiss watch industry fu-





















ture did not look bright at all in the 1970s. Obvi-
ously, there was a need for a dramatic change of 
strategy and business model. Instead of retreat-
ing toward the upper end of the market, the 
Swiss watch industry fi nally faced the cheaper 
Far Eastern competition by introducing Swatch. 
A combination of advanced engineering and 
innovative marketing approach, Swatch quickly 
became a global success and one of the most 
famous Swiss brands. 
5.1. The role of Nicolas G. Hayek in 
the emergence of Swatch
From his early days, Nicolas G. Hayek was consid-
ered a very confi dent and unconventional think-
er (Dreifuss, 2011). In 1979, a government-ap-
pointed group of Swiss banks hired Hayek’s 
company to evaluate and report on how the 
two main Swiss watch manufacturers, ASUAG 
(Allgemeine Schweizerische Uhrenindustrie AG) 
and SSIH (Société Suisse pour l’Industrie Hor-
logère), could be most eff ectively sold (Pope, 
2010). He investigated the industry and found 
that Swiss watchmakers were very ineffi  cient 
due to a poor marketing strategy and lack of au-
tomation, resulting in declining sales and high 
production cost (Dreifuss, 2011). Hayek, com-
ing from a diff erent cultural background, had a 
much higher tolerance for risk, which diff erenti-
ated him from his counterparts in the industry 
at the time. Instead of selling or shutting down 
the companies, he proposed a merger of ASUAG 
and SSIH, which took place in 1983 (Donzé, 2014). 
Due to his personal commitment and visionary 
thinking, banks largely followed Hayek’s recom-
mendation. However, despite obvious improve-
ments and optimistic forecasts for the industry, 
the banks were not willing to continue with the 
project and wanted to sell their shares. This de-
velopment turned into an opportunity for Hayek 
and he took a major stake in the newly formed 
group, now called Société Suisse de Microélec-
tronique et d’Horlogerie (SMH), by buying a 51 % 
share in 1984 (Childs, 2010). Hayek became the 
chairperson and CEO of SMH in 1986.
Hayek’s restructuring plan for SMH had two ma-
jor focuses. First, he recognized the potential of 
the high-end brands like Omega, Longines, Tis-
sot, and Breguetbrand. He doubled their prices 
and emphasized the heritage value of the tra-
ditional Swiss industry (Childs, 2010). Further-
more, he had a clear vision for Omega to build a 
high-margin brand into a direct competitor for 
Rolex (Wegelin, 2010). On the other hand, Hayek 
also focused on the lower end of the market 
dominated by Far Eastern producers. 
Although Hayek took a lot of credit for Swatch, 
the watch was actually developed by two en-
gineers, Elmar Mock and Jacques Müller, under 
the supervision of Ernst Thomke (Childs, 2010). 
The fi rst Swatch model was introduced in 1983, 
during Hayek’s consulting era. Consequently, 
Hayek did not have the opportunity to active-
ly participate in the process of new product 
development. However, Hayek’s vision and in-
novative marketing approach made Swatch a 
very successful story by the late 1980s. From a 
marketing perspective, Swatch was positioned 
as a second watch and an accessory, rather than 
just a timepiece. The management considered 
it a key success to develop a customer base of 
repeat customers as it yielded suffi  cient reve-
nue. In 1998, SMH changed its name to Swatch 
Group, additionally emphasizing the impor-
tance of the Swatch brand for the whole group.
5.2. Product and process 
innovation
The relatively low cost of production for Far 
Eastern watch manufacturers was one of the 
competitive elements that favored them when 
competing directly against Swiss-made watch-
es. Traditional Swiss watches were technologi-
cally diff erent. Their mechanical movement had 
a large number of parts that were assembled 
by skilled and well-trained employees, which 
also required a great deal of time. On the oth-
er hand, watches with quartz movement were 
much simpler with signifi cantly higher precision 
in measuring time. The traditional manufactur-
ing of Swiss-made watches took more working 
hours to manufacture, which meant a higher 
direct cost of labor (Donzé, 2015). 





















In order to close the price gap between Swiss-
made watches and watches produced in coun-
tries with low labor costs, a complete change to 
the traditional Swiss concept of watch manu-
facturing model had to be introduced. The cost 
of direct labor had to be reduced signifi cantly, 
together with the overall cost of production. 
During the research and development phase, 
Ernst Thomke set an initial production cost to 
be CHF 10 per unit, which would fall to CHF 5 
per unit with economies of scale, resulting in 
60 % of the production cost at that time (Garel, 
2015). Obviously, this required both product and 
production innovation.
Product innovation included design and manu-
facturing of a watch with quartz movement – a 
technology that the Swiss watch industry was 
not very enthusiastic about. To be able to com-
pete in the same price category with Far Eastern 
and U.S. competitors to a degree, plastic mate-
rials had to be used instead of traditional metal 
ones, the movement was to be electronic with 
an analogue display and – as a particular novel-
ty – once made, the casing of the watch could 
not be opened. This meant that any repairs to 
the watch were practically impossible. 
Engineers under Ernst Thomke’s supervision 
designed a watch that contained only 51 parts, 
down from between 90 to 150 for a convention-
al analogue quartz watch (Tushman & Radov, 
2000). Furthermore, the engineers developed 
a method of mounting movements and other 
parts directly into the watch casing, as opposed 
to the traditional building of a casing around 
the watch after the movement was assembled 
(Tushman & Radov, 2000). This innovation also 
saved time in the production process and in-
creased overall effi  ciency. 
In order to produce such a timepiece, Swatch 
built production facilities from the bottom up 
and in doing so drew on the rich expertise of 
Swiss engineers. The traditional profi ciency 
paired with innovation in the manufacturing of 
plastic parts (injection molding) for the quartz 
movement were the crucial components to its 
success. The highly automated production pro-
cess provided two important opportunities for 
Swatch. First, the automated production pro-
cess provided the opportunity for large-scale 
production and, second, the unit cost of the 
Swatch enabled the company to place the of-
fering within the same product category as its 
main competition.
Additionally, with the integrated production 
process and manufacturing facilities under full 
control and ownership, Swatch was able to pro-
vide a quick response to any type of change in 
product design (Hines, 2007). This eff ectively 
shortened cycle time for Swatch products and 
provided Swatch with technical capabilities to 
introduce more varieties of watch designs with-
in the same period of time necessary for com-
petitors to be able to do the same. While tradi-
tional watch producers spent years developing 
new models, Swatch established a six-month 
lead time between design phase and collection 
launch. Technically speaking, every six months 
Swatch’s internal design departments (i.e. 
Swatch Design Lab) in Milan, Tokyo, and New 
York would prepare an extensive portfolio of 
designs for the next collection. In the late 1980s, 
designers would come up with more than 400 
designs in this proposal phase. After initial inter-
nal screening, around 150 designs would circu-
late between the three design departments for 
further assessment. With multicultural design 
teams working from three separate locations 
on assessing each other’s proposals, only the 
designs that would fi t the global taste would be 
selected. However, regional versions of the col-
lections were developed sometimes.
5.3. Marketing approach behind 
Swatch turnaround
Beyond the technical aspects of product and 
process innovation, the key distinction of the 
business model that separated Swatch from 
other Swiss watch producers was their mar-
keting approach (Morrison & Bouquet, 1999). 
Swatch had a signifi cantly diff erent approach 
to marketing than other Swiss watch manufac-
turers had ever had. Manufacturing fl exibility 
provided by the production processes was fully 





















exploited in the overall shift of Swatch from a 
production-based business model, traditionally 
present in the Swiss watch industry, toward a 
market-led business model. 
Hayek realized that the label “Swiss Made” was 
a strategic asset. He reasoned that timepieces 
that were direct competitors and sold at simi-
lar price points would be diff erentiated, among 
other things, based on their country-of-origin 
(Taylor, 1993). Without doubt, the “Swiss Made” 
label drove sales of Swatch:
We have realized that “Made in Switzerland” 
is a driving factor for watches. [...] Consumers 
were willing to pay a premium price for a plas-
tic Swiss watch. (P. Petersen)
However, this could also hinder attempts to 
lower cost due to higher labor cost in Switzer-
land and the so-called “Swiss-made” legislation 
that limited the use of imported parts for watch 
movements up to 50 % of the value of the parts 
as a whole (Donzé, 2014). Therefore, Swatch 
did not have an option to move production to 
the countries with lower labor cost, as many 
of global companies did to reduce production 
cost. Swatch had to focus on improving effi  -
ciency within its production plants in Switzer-
land, mainly by reducing the impact of labor. By 
fully automating the production process and 
designing-for-manufacture, Swatch was able to 
decrease direct labor cost to below 10 % of a 
watch’s retail price. Furthermore, by command-
ing a country-of-origin price premium of rough-
ly the same amount, the low-cost advantage of 
Far Eastern producers was eff ectively eliminated 
from the competitive equation (Taylor, 1993).
Since both the Swiss watch industry and the 
Swiss market were traditional and conservative 
at that time, the new watch was fi rst introduced 
to the U.S. market in late 1982. A limited quantity 
of 10,000 watches was put on sale in Houston, 
Texas (Garel, 2015). Although this was a commer-
cial failure, it provided a valuable lesson. The de-
sign had to be changed because the fi rst Swatch 
models did not diff er signifi cantly from the tra-
ditional mechanical watches, and the marketing 
eff ort had to be more intense (Donzé, 2014). 
Consequently, Marvin Traub, CEO of Blooming-
dale’s, requested two collections per year with 
at least twenty diff erent models, in both colorful 
and designer watches (Garel, 2015). 
The second launch occurred on March 1st, 1983 
in Zurich, when Swatch launched the rede-
signed 12-model collection at prices ranging 
from CHF 39.90 to 50. Thanks to a successful 
launch, all the prices were raised to CHF 50 by 
the end of 1983 (Mudambi, 2005). In the 1970s 
and early 1980s, it seemed almost impossible 
to produce a watch in Switzerland and sell it 
for CHF 50 because the cost to produce even 
the cheapest watch in 1980 was CHF 25 (Garel, 
2015). However, Swatch made it, while achieving 
very good margins. Swatch essentially rebuilt 
the entire value chain to create a strategic fi t 
with the new competitive environment, while 
simultaneously benefi ting from the perceptions 
of quality that consumers traditionally attached 
to Swiss-made watches. Redesign of the entire 
value chain had the most profound impact on 
the marketing approach of Swatch (Bruce & 
Daly, 2006). By achieving price parity against its 
main competitors within the key product cate-
gories and having the operational capabilities to 
respond quickly to changing consumer tastes, 
Swatch created prerequisites for a deployment 
of a unique marketing strategy within the Swiss 
watch industry.
Since Swatch watches were not capable of be-
ing repaired, which was not only a novelty for 
the Swiss-made watch but for the watch mar-
ket in general, the price point had to be low 
enough not to discourage buyers from purchas-
ing but also to provide an adequate margin for 
Swatch. Quality uncertainty was to a degree 
addressed by the Swiss-made label, and rela-
tively low pricing was possible due to low pro-
duction costs. For Swatch to be able to achieve 
adequate revenues and growth, it was apparent 
that it needed to sell large quantities of watches. 
The Swatch management team concluded that 
large targeted unit sales were only achievable 
by stepping away from a traditional marketing 





















approach. The big idea was to create a watch 
that functions as a fashion product rather than 
a pure timepiece:
The designs were very unconventional. Watch-
es were not unicolor. They were covered with 
diff erent patterns and it was not always easy 
to read the time. (P. Petersen)
When the purchasing decision becomes an 
emotional rather than a rational one, large quan-
tities can be reached. Swatch watches eff ective-
ly became disposable fashion. A type of watch 
you would wear for a while and then dispose 
of without high value loss. Relatively aff ordable 
prices also allowed target consumers to own 
multiple Swatch watches that would suit their 
diff erent needs and occasions.
During the early years, distributors did not ac-
cept the idea of a disposable watch warmly. 
Traditional distributors of Swiss-made watches 
were jewelers who also collected a signifi cant 
portion of revenues from watch repair. With 
the Swatch design and manufacturing process, 
watch repair was not an option; hence, an op-
portunity for revenues beyond selling was elim-
inated. Consequently, at the beginning, jewelers 
refused to carry the Swatch as the cheap plastic 
quartz watch simply did not fi t their tradition-
al inventory. Hence, Swatch was, to a degree, 
forced to use nonconventional retail outlets for 
selling watches, such as department stores and 
even on board of airplanes:
One of our fi rst distribution channels were air-
lines, in fl ight sales. […] People were calling the 
fl ight-booking department to check if they are 
going to have a certain model of Swatch for 
sale on board. (P. Petersen)
In 1988, the management decided that depart-
ment stores were not an emotional environ-
ment for the sale of the product, leading to the 
idea of a self-developed distribution channel. 
This idea was not well-received among business 
analysts because the creation of a complete-
ly new retail outlet with only one product was 
considered highly questionable to say the least. 
Nevertheless, Swatch management introduced 
fl agship stores (i.e. an outlet carrying a single 
brand), a common concept within the fashion 
industry where the consumer could feel the 
brand (Kapferer & Bastien, 2012). Besides provid-
ing customers with an emotional retail environ-
ment designed to convey the brand’s message, 
Swatch provided a certain level of exclusivity for 
its products.
It became obvious that Swatch’s target audi-
ence would not include older generations as 
their concept of buying a timepiece (i.e. a big 
decision made once or twice in a lifetime) was in 
opposition with the watch concept that Swatch 
needed to off er. Swatch had to focus on creat-
ing an appeal to the younger audience as the 
primary target market. Therefore, the Swatch 
timepiece needed to be a fashionable product 
and Swatch Lab designers managed to provide 
a fashionable design (Taylor, 1993). To create 
strong consumer interest, design was changed 
frequently, a feature made possible by short time 
to market. This approach led to an increased 
number of product lines (seasons) compared to 
other watch manufacturers. Swatch introduced 
two seasonal collections per year, which could 
be considered another strategic drift from the 
traditional watch industry that would keep the 
same models for years. Moreover, Swatch intro-
duced limited edition specials in between its 
standard collections, thus further shortening 
time to market and maintaining the hype for its 
products throughout the year. This approach 
helped create excitement among target cus-
tomers in anticipating new watch designs to 
reach the market. Additional excitement was ac-
centuated by the fact that the same watch de-
sign was never repeated, which resulted in long 
queues in front of their fl agship stores when a 
new collection was launched.
Advertising eff orts greatly supported the Swatch 
marketing and production model. Constant and 
aggressive marketing with innovative product 
placings exposed the Swatch brand to its target 
market with high intensity. Swatch launched 
highly publicized campaigns such as when, in 
1984, a functioning 13-ton watch was mounted 





















on the headquarters of Commerzbank in Frank-
furt, Germany. The same approach was used 
in Tokyo with commensurate success (Taylor, 
1993). Swatch’s production model, paired with 
an innovative marketing strategy, suggests that 
technical innovation is not suffi  cient to create 
a successful brand but that it has to be linked 
to market demands and be marketed when the 
occasion arises (Proctor, 1998). Meanwhile, tradi-
tional sales arguments were reliability and price, 
particularly with Asian Far Eastern quartz watch-
es. Swatch changed that and considered price 
and quality a given, therefore focusing on mar-
keting Swatch as a lifestyle product. This can be 
further observed in Swatch’s eff ort with regard 
to sports marketing. Swatch was a trailblazer in 
this arena, sponsoring any unique sport, from 
snowboarding to beach volleyball, and thus 
enforcing the brand’s idea of an individual and 
exiting lifestyle. 
6. DISCUSSION
As the case study revealed, at the time of its 
emergence, the Swatch business model was 
radically diff erent from anything that existed in 
the Swiss watchmaking industry. The traditional 
Swiss-made watch received a cheaper, plastic, 
and trendy incarnation, positioned as a fashion 
piece rather than a timepiece. Although Swatch 
sold at CHF 50 was not inexpensive compared 
with the Far Eastern competition, it was very 
cheap for a Swiss-made watch and, therefore, 
quite aff ordable. Swatch introduced two sea-
sonal collections per year, a concept borrowed 
from the traditional apparel industry (Spring-
steel, 2013). With frequent seasonal collections, 
consisting of unique designs that were not re-
peated in later collections, Swatch motivated 
consumers for multiple purchases a year, result-
ing in disposable products. This is another of 
the main characteristics of fast fashion (Watson 
& Yan, 2013; Payne, 2011). Swatch also followed 
fashion trends and adapted its design to appeal 
to trendy consumers, another strategy not fol-
lowed by the traditional watch manufacturers, 
but common for fast fashion brands (Collet et 
al., 2013; Morgan & Birtwistle, 2009; Hines, 2007). 
Furthermore, Swatch vertically integrated the 
production process to support a relatively fast 
cycle of collections and six months lead time 
for a new collection, resulting in a very short 
product lifecycle within the watch industry. This 
way, Swatch was able to quickly introduce new 
designs to the market, which is the crux of fast 
fashion (Hines, 2007). Obviously, Swatch suc-
cessfully adopted multiple concepts from the 
fast fashion business model, which provides 
support for P1.
Although fast fashion could be considered a 
unique model, there is a spectrum of FFFs ad-
opted within the fashion industry itself (Run-
fola & Guercini, 2013). Due to specifi c markets, 
consumer preferences, and internal capabilities, 
companies tend to develop their own variants 
of the fast fashion model. Taking into account 
the specifi cs of the watch industry, Swatch cus-
tomized few elements of its FFF. For example, 
lead time for a new collection is longer then 
in the case of fashion industry. Furthermore, 
Swatch reinvented the industry with the intro-
duction of two seasonal collections. Within the 
watch industry, that would traditionally keep 
the same models for years, this innovative move 
resulted in extremely short lifecycles compared 
with industry standards. 
Besides the common elements found in the fast 
fashion model, Swatch emphasized an addi-
tional factor within its FFF. As a side eff ect of the 
vertical integration and short lead time, Swatch 
relies on the country-of-origin eff ect. While the 
country-of-origin eff ect refers to stereotyping 
and generalization of the quality of products 
originating from an individual country (Suh, Hur 
& Davies, 2016), the eff ect itself diff ers among 
diff erent product categories and countries 
(Costa, Carneiro & Goldszmidt, 2016). However, 
Swiss-made has a certain value for consumers 
within the context of the watch industry (Breid-
ing, 2013; Taylor, 1993). While the country-of-or-
igin eff ect is not commonly considered as an 
element of the fast fashion business model, 
it proved to be one of the key success factors 





















for Swatch and a unique element of its FFF. The 
case study clearly demonstrated the applicabil-
ity of the fast fashion model within the watch 
industry. However, successful application also 
requires customization and adaptation of the 
model, which is also detected in the case of 
Swatch. Therefore, research fi ndings provided 
support for P2. 
Figure 1 highlights the key strategic compo-
nents within Swatch’s business model intro-
duced in 1980s as indicated by this study. It is 
evident that most of these elements, successful-
ly developed and applied by Swatch, are indis-
tinguishable from the characteristics commonly 
attributed to the FFF. 
FIGURE 1: Elements of Swatch’s fast fashion for-
mula 
Source: authors’ own work
7. CONCLUSION
Faced with the threat of extinction, Swatch 
emerged as a brand that innovated and es-
tablished a strong market presence by moving 
away from the traditional Swiss watch-making 
business model. Swatch implemented aspects 
of the fast fashion business model to its turn-
around strategy. The new strategy was a result 
of joint eff orts of Ernst Thomke and Nicolas G. 
Hayek. While Thomke was focused on the tech-
nological aspects of the new watch, Hayek, a 
creative and unconventional thinker, was the 
strategic and marketing mastermind of Swatch. 
Hayek introduced a business model and market-
ing strategy that represented novelty within the 
rigid and traditional Swiss watch industry. The 
new marketing strategy essentially changed the 
way consumers perceived the product catego-
ry. Instead of just being a timepiece, a watch be-
came an accessory, a fashion icon with a short 
lifecycle. In essence, Hayek provided consumers 
with aff ordable and disposable watches with 
the all the positive eff ects that came with the 
“Swiss Made” label. 
Carried out within the context of the Swiss 
watch industry, this study is limited in scope. 
Furthermore, our analysis has focused on a 
single case study, which probably additionally 
limits its external validity. However, its in-depth 
analysis of the particular phenomenon yielded 
valuable insights into the application of the FFF 
outside the apparel industry. As the case anal-
ysis suggests, innovation and fresh perspective 
leading to a major strategic shift could save an 
industry from its extinction.
This study provides empirical support for the 
application of the fast fashion model outside 
the apparel industry, which is a topic that has 
received very limited attention among research-
ers. Since the study managed to establish a fi rm 
link between the application of the fast fashion 
business model and the success of Swatch, the 
fi ndings may encourage other researchers to 
explore full or partial applications of the model 
outside the apparel industry. Furthermore, the 
case of Swatch may also provide a reference and 
an inspiration to marketing managers trying to 
reinvent more or less traditional markets and 
products. However, the fact that each industry 
has some specifi cs and lead times could be per-
ceived diff erently should also be considered. As 
this study reveals, Swatch’s FFF is not as “fast” 
as is the case with fast fashion apparel brands, 













































down to a few weeks. Nevertheless, compared 
with watch industry standards, Swatch’s busi-
ness model introduced very short lead times 
and product lifecycles. Thus, “fast” seems to be 
a relative and industry specifi c variable within a 
business model outside the apparel industry.
Although Swatch is still considered as a suc-
cessful brand, new challenges are arising. With 
the market introduction of the so-called “smart-
watch” concept (e.g. Apple Watch and Samsung 
Gear), the concept of a wristwatch is again be-
ing redefi ned. Until now, there were no indica-
tions that Swatch was going to enter this new 
product category. 
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